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Principles and Persons: 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Raconteuse 
Kenneth L. Karst* 
Before she was appointed to the judiciary, Ruth Bader Ginsburg was often identified as 
the nation’s foremost legal advocate for women’s claim to equal citizenship. 
Eventually, some years after she had become Justice Ginsburg, she was assigned to 
write the opinion for the Supreme Court’s most sweeping decision validating that claim. 
Throughout her career as lawyer and judge, she has had a number of occasions to tell 
the stories of her former clients and other women. This Article considers several themes 
in those references, in particular her persistent efforts to give credit to other women for 
their courage and their fortitude. 
 
 * David G. Price and Dallas P. Price Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA School of Law. I offer 
this comment in memory of Martin D. Ginsburg. He is the very model of a modern masculinity. 
 
My thanks to Leslie Karst for reviewing a draft of this Article. 
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In the recognition of women’s constitutional right to equal 
citizenship, the Supreme Court went from near zero to a point 
approaching 100% in the quarter century from 1971 to 1996. As every 
reader knows, in the 1970s the leading women’s rights advocate to the 
Court was Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and in 1996, when that Court set the 
capstone on this development, it was Justice Ginsburg who wrote the 
Court’s opinion.1 It is no wonder that, when she is invited to write or 
speak, she is expected to discuss the Constitution’s guarantees of equal 
rights for women. Obviously, she doesn’t own the subject,2 but surely she 
is entitled to preside over it in its grand scale. My main point in this 
comment is that the grand scale is by no means her only subject. She 
repeatedly invokes the images of individual citizens, both advocates and 
clients, who have claimed and proclaimed women’s rights to equality. 
Her stories begin early, with the campaign of Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton and Susan B. Anthony opposing ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.3 These suffragists were worried that the amendment’s second 
section, with its repeated references to “male” in tandem with “citizen,” 
would undermine women’s efforts to appeal to the amendment’s 
substantive guarantees.4 As then-Judge Ginsburg wrote in 1986, their 
skepticism was justified.5 For the Fourteenth Amendment’s first century, 
the Equal Protection Clause was useless in the quest for women’s 
equality.6 The individuals whose experiences are recounted by Ginsburg 
are not limited to major figures like Stanton and Anthony. They include 
people whose names identify cases that are now familiar—think of Sally 
Reed or Stephen Wiesenfeld.7 Behind the delays and the advances in 
constitutional rights, she identifies the conditions and doings of particular 
people. When she speaks of principles, she points to persons. 
In the discussion that follows, I call attention to Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s writings before she was a judge and her later writings other 
than judicial opinions.8 These writings compose a considerable body of 
 
 1. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 2. The writing on the constitutional law of women’s rights is distinguished. I shall not list 
authors, for fear of making careless omissions. Anyone who reads this will have her own list—and 
many of you would be on any list that I might offer. Some of you have disagreed sharply with Justice 
Ginsburg’s views. Most of you are cited—and always treated with respect—in Ruth Bader Ginsburg & 
Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 9, 17. 
 3. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, 9 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 41, 41 (1986) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Interpretations]. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. The cases involving these people appear in every decent casebook on constitutional law. They 
are discussed infra notes 12–37 and accompanying text. 
 8. I shall cite some sources beyond Justice Ginsburg’s own writing, but at the outset I want to 
identify one article that is indispensable for anyone who wants to understand her work as an advocate 
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work, and a big proportion of it recounts the acts and feelings of other 
individuals. Plainly, she wants to know—and wants us to know—about 
the law’s interactions with people, one by one. Still, if you pay attention 
to the stories she tells, you will sense that her own story lies underneath. 
At first, she was Professor Ginsburg in the Rutgers (Newark) Law 
School.9 At the request of students, she designed and taught a course on 
women and the law. In 1970, she remarked to a panel of the Association 
of American Law Schools that such “courses develop two themes: the 
part law has played in assisting society to ‘protect’ women (and keep 
them in their place) and the stimulus law might provide in the evolution 
of society toward equality and independence for the still submissive 
sex.”10 Law teachers who use the “case method” in their classrooms—
that is, nearly all of us—know the educational value of viewing the law’s 
effects on individual litigants in real-life situations. However long ago we 
may have studied law, we all remember the facts of some classroom 
cases, and even think of some legal rules with those litigants at least 
dimly in mind. Outside the classroom, Professor Ginsburg was the 
inspiration and founding director of the Women’s Law Project of the 
American Civil Liberties Union—a responsibility she carried with her in 
1972 when she moved to Columbia Law School. Just as a trial lawyer will 
present the testimony of particular witnesses as a story that fits her 
client’s version of the case, an appellate lawyer will seek to educate 
judges by similar means. So, well before she joined the judiciary in 1980, 
Justice Ginsburg’s experiences as teacher and lawyer had given her a 
solid grounding in the art of relating legal principles to the lives of 
individuals. 
Some of her teaching and all of her litigation focused on securing 
women’s full recognition as equal citizens, and her early writings on the 
subject were part of a political campaign. From the beginning, Professor 
Ginsburg understood that her litigation was only one element in a larger 
social movement that was bringing new opportunities to women. Her job 
as a litigator was to teach about women’s capacities and the injustice of 
denying them full participation in public and private institutions. One 
goal of this educational effort was to call attention to the rapid increase 
in women’s participation in the ranks of workers, and particularly in 
positions of great responsibility. To counteract long-standing stereotypes 
of “the nature of woman”—women in general—she brought into the 
 
and as a judge: Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform Litigation and Its Challenges: An Essay in Honor of 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 Harv. J.L. & Gender 251 (2009). From 1983 to 1984, Professor 
Klarman clerked for Judge Ginsburg in the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 251. 
 9. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Treatment of Women by the Law: Awakening Consciousness in the Law 
Schools, 5 Val. U. L. Rev. 480, 480 (1971). 
 10. Id.  
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courtroom the lives of particular women and men. Her writings in the 
1970s brought those litigants’ stories to the attention of lawyers, and also 
to readers of journals aimed primarily at a larger audience of women. 
Many in this latter group did not need convincing, but they did need 
information about the movement’s progress in one field after another. In 
short, she was teaching both women and men about the implications of 
women’s equal citizenship. The experiences of her clients could serve as 
talking points in many contexts. 
In Professor Ginsburg’s litigation campaign in the 1970s, and in her 
more general writings, her accounts of individuals’ lives have served 
instrumental purposes. Even today, Justice Ginsburg’s writings teach her 
listeners and readers similar lessons. But these descriptions are not 
merely instrumental. Whether she is discussing the cases that were the 
subjects of her own briefs and arguments, or describing earlier cases in 
which women’s claims were defeated, or recounting the work of others 
who have served the cause of women’s equal citizenship, her stories 
make clear that she cares about their protagonists. Professor Ginsburg 
saw her forerunner advocates, and the litigants in their cases, as 
individuals. Her writings in later years show that she has retained that 
regard—and that concern—for each advocate and each litigant that she 
discusses. I applaud her for that.11 
Three 1970s Clients Whose Cases Changed the Law,  
and One Might-Have-Been 
From the beginning, Professor Ginsburg saw what seemed to be 
coming. In 1971, in a speech to a group of law women, she mentioned an 
ACLU case in the current term, Reed v. Reed,12 saying, “the turning point 
is in view.”13 She went on to give her audience a quick summary of the 
facts in Sally Reed’s case.14 In later writings, she elaborated.15 Sally Reed 
and her husband Cecil were separated.16 Her only income was her pay for 
taking elderly people into her home for care. At first, Sally had custody 
 
 11. Here I should note that I have known her since her days at Rutgers and Columbia, and we 
have stayed in touch for half a century. Today, she is as considerate (and, we shall see, as generous) as 
she was in the 1960s. 
 12. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 13. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex and Unequal Protection: Men and Women as Victims, 11 J. Fam. L. 
347, 353 (1971). 
 14. Id. at 353–54. 
 15. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means of 
Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 263, 267 (1997) 
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Equal Stature]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. Cin. 
L. Rev. 1, 10 (1975) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Gender]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women’s 
Progress in the Legal Profession in the United States, 33 Tulsa L.J. 13, 17 (1997); Ginsburg & Flagg, 
supra note 2, at 15. 
 16. Ginsburg, Equal Stature, supra note 15, at 267.  
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of their son Richard, but when he was no longer “of tender years” he was 
placed in the custody of his father.17 He “fell in with a bad crowd and 
spent some time in a corrections facility.” Upon release to his father’s 
custody, he was deeply depressed, and at age twenty, he killed himself 
with his father’s gun. Sally wanted to deal with Richard’s belongings, and 
petitioned the Idaho court to be appointed administrator of the boy’s 
estate; soon afterward, Cecil entered his own petition. The court did not 
hold a hearing, but appointed Cecil. Under the governing Idaho statute, 
in a case of conflicting petitions from persons “equally entitled” to 
administer the estate of a decedent, “males must be preferred to 
females.”18 The Supreme Court’s decision striking down the Idaho law 
was unanimous.19 Today’s law students see this as a clear-cut case of sex 
discrimination, and so it is; but when Reed was decided, it broke new 
ground. The Equal Protection Clause, a central feature of the Fourteenth 
Amendment adopted in 1868, had its very first application to sex 
discrimination a century later. Reed was, indeed, a turning point. 
Two years later, the Court took its next step in Frontiero v. 
Richardson.20 Professor Ginsburg’s client was Sharon Frontiero, a U.S. 
Air Force Lieutenant. Sharon’s husband, Joseph Frontiero, was a full-
time college student, receiving support under the G.I. Bill. Sharon’s pay 
provided three-fourths of the family’s income. Under the governing 
regulations, however, she was not entitled to a housing allowance; nor 
was her husband entitled to medical benefits, for his income provided 
just over half of his own support. If the sexes were reversed, the 
regulations provided that a male officer would get those family benefits 
automatically. As Professor Ginsburg later said, the regulation thus 
“presumed a wife’s, but not a husband’s, dependent status.”21 This sort of 
discrimination was found in many statutes, notably those provided in the 
system of Social Security. The Frontieros both sued, alleging 
discrimination against Sharon (denied benefits a male officer would get) 
and against Joseph (denied benefits a service wife would get).22 The 
Supreme Court, in an 8–1 decision, held this discrimination 
 
 17. The “tender years” boundary itself resulted from stereotyping: A mother gives comfort 
during a boy’s tender years, and a father is a role model as the boy learns to be a man in a man’s 
world. 
 18. The Idaho legislature had repealed this statute—but only prospectively—before the case was 
decided by the Supreme Court. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971). 
 19. The vote was 7–0. Reed, 404 U.S. at 71. Justices Black and Harlan had retired, and President 
Nixon had not yet appointed Justices Powell and Rehnquist. 
 20. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The “personal” aspects of this case, described below, are set out in 
Ginsburg, Gender, supra note 15, at 21. 
 21. Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 2, at 15. 
 22. Ginsburg, Gender, supra note 15, at 21. 
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unconstitutional.23 Four of the Justices agreed with Professor Ginsburg’s 
argument that governmental sex discrimination should be evaluated 
under a “strict scrutiny” standard of review, but three others in the 
majority suggested that the pendency of the Equal Rights Amendment 
made such a ruling premature.24 In a lecture the following year, Professor 
Ginsburg said, “Reed and Frontiero had the appearance of well-planned 
first steps in a sustained litigation campaign.”25 She should know. 
The woman in the case named Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld was not the 
plaintiff (Stephen), but his wife, Paula Polatschek Wiesenfeld.26 She had 
taught mathematics in a public school in New Jersey.27 When she died in 
childbirth, baby Jason survived, and Stephen wanted to care for Jason 
personally at home.28 As Justice Ginsburg put it not long ago, “He vowed 
not to work full-time until his son was in school full-time.”29 The Social 
Security system would provide what the law called “Mother’s insurance 
benefits” for stay-at-home widow-mothers, but not for stay-at-home 
widower-fathers.30 Thus the law discriminated against female workers 
(reducing the value of their work) and also against the men who were 
women’s surviving spouses—and, of course, their children. Plainly, the 
law’s distinction was founded on the “protective” assumption that 
women who are widowed need a replacement for the income lost when 
fathers die, but men—assumed to be breadwinners—need no such aid. 
Professor Ginsburg won Stephen’s case, again from a unanimous Court.31 
In a 1997 lecture—some twenty-two years after this decision—Justice 
Ginsburg remarked that Stephen Wiesenfeld had been “an extraordinarily 
devoted parent.”32 She went on to note that Jason was then “completing 
his third year at Columbia Law School.”33 Now, where did he get that 
idea? 
One more set of Ginsburgian recollections, before we move on: In 
her 1993 Madison Lecture, given just before Judge Ginsburg became 
Justice Ginsburg, she told the story of another client of hers in the early 
1970s.34 The case might have been a doctrinal game-changer—but the 
 
 23. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678–91 (1973). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Ginsburg, Gender, supra note 15, at 12. 
 26. 420 U.S. 636, 639 (1975). 
 27. Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 2, at 16. 
 28. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Elena Kagan, Remarks Commemorating Celebration 55: The 
Women’s Leadership Summit, 32 Harv. J.L. & Gender 233, 247 (2009). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 637 n.1. 
 31. Id. at 637. 
 32. Ginsburg, Equal Stature, supra note 15, at 268. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1200–02 (1992) 
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Judicial Voice]. The case is Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) 
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Supreme Court had not decided it. Like Frontiero, this one arose in the 
military. Captain Susan Struck, a nursing supervisor, had made the Air 
Force her career. Her commanding colonel called her work “exemplary,” 
but her career was threatened when she became pregnant while she was 
in Vietnam. An Air Force regulation made childbirth a ground for 
mandatory termination of a woman officer’s commission. Another 
regulation offered Air Force hospital facilities for abortion—indeed, 
encouraged such a resort to preserve an officer’s career—but Captain 
Struck’s religion closed that avenue. She used her accumulated leave 
time for the childbirth and promptly placed the infant for adoption. On 
her behalf, Professor Ginsburg argued in federal court that the Air 
Force’s regulation violated Captain Struck’s equal protection rights 
because it imposed no limitation on male officers who became fathers. A 
powerful argument, we now understand. 
The lower courts didn’t see it that way; they denied relief. The 
Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari—whereupon the Air Force 
waived its regulation and allowed Captain Struck to continue her career. 
The Court then dismissed the case as moot. Two decades later, Judge 
Ginsburg remarked that, if the Supreme Court had decided Struck v. 
Secretary of Defense, it might have issued a relatively narrow opinion 
founded on women’s equality-based constitutional right to control their 
own bodies—thus making way for a gradual recognition of women’s 
reproductive rights.35 In her own litigation, Professor Ginsburg had 
adopted just such a gradual approach to nudge the Court toward a more 
generalized validation of women’s equal citizenship. She suggested that if 
the Court had adopted a similar approach in this field, perhaps it might 
have avoided the shock of Roe v. Wade36 and the massive political 
mobilization triggered by that decision.37 We’ll never know. 
Giving Credit 
What we do know—partly because Judge Ginsburg reminded us—is 
that Reed, Frontiero, and Wiesenfeld were all decisions of the Burger 
Court, not its “liberal” predecessor.38 It is characteristic of her to give 
credit where credit is due, notably including credit to women in earlier 
 
(mem.). Pages cited here include all references to the Struck case that follow. 
 35. Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 34, at 1202. 
 36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 37. Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 34, at 1200; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on 
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375, 381 (1985). 
 38. Ginsburg, Interpretations, supra note 3, at 42–43. In a footnote, Judge Ginsburg also cited 
eight more women’s rights decisions of the Burger Court. Id. at 42–43 n.8. In my judgment, the most 
important of these later decisions was Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) 
(O’Connor, J., majority opinion). See infra note 40. 
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times who fought the good fight for women’s equality, but without 
success. The heroines of her stories include judges, litigants, and 
advocates in court; they also include women whose advocacy found 
venues outside the courtroom. Every one of them is offered as a role 
model. 
During her Supreme Court years, Justice Ginsburg has identified a 
number of female judges who have been her own role models. Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, of course, gets high marks for introducing her 
new colleague to the Court’s arcana. But, more generally, Justice 
Ginsburg gives her sister Justice credit for serving the cause of women’s 
equality. This credit is entirely deserved. When Justice O’Connor joined 
the Court, the two most recent decisions on women’s equality issues had 
diluted the strong standard of review for sex discrimination recently 
established in Craig v. Boren,39 but her appointment was crucial in 
restoring order.40 It is no accident that, when Justice Ginsburg wants to 
show Justice O’Connor at her best, she does so by quoting her words 
spoken to a conference on “Women in Power”: “As women achieve 
power, the barriers will fall. As society sees what women can do, as 
women see what women can do, there will be more women out there 
doing things, and we’ll all be better off for it.”41 If you were taking a 
Supreme Court quiz and asked to identify the author of those sentences, 
wouldn’t you pause before answering? 
In 1995, addressing a conference of female judges, Justice Ginsburg 
told the stories of three women who were among the earliest to serve as 
federal judges: Florence Ellinwood Allen, Burnita Shelton Matthews, 
and Shirley Mount Hufstedler.42 I offer only brief summaries here—all 
taken from Justice Ginsburg’s talk. Judge Allen was a polymath: concert 
 
 39. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). As the Craig opinion had it, a law that limited women but not men would 
be invalid unless it contributed in a substantial way to achieving an important government interest. Id. 
at 197. In two more recent cases, however, Justice Rehnquist led majorities to uphold such laws when 
men and women were “not similarly situated.” Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) 
(decided 5–4); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78 (1981). If this toothless standard had taken hold, it 
would have undermined the gains for a constitutionalized right of women’s equality achieved during 
the 1970s. 
 40. Her opinion for the 5–4 majority in Mississippi University for Women, 458 U.S. at 718–33, 
reclaimed the ground Justice Rehnquist had seized, and the Court has not looked back. See infra Part 
IV (discussing VMI). On Justice O’Connor’s role in this development, see Kenneth L. Karst, Through 
Streets Broad and Narrow: Six “Centrist” Justices on the Paths to Inclusion, 2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 18–20. 
 41. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 
1240 (2006) (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, Address to the Sixteenth Annual Olin Conference: 
Women in Power (Nov. 14, 1990)). Justice Ginsburg does make brief mention of Justice O’Connor’s 
life story, but that need not be repeated here. 
 42. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Laura W. Brill, Women in the Federal Judiciary: Three Way Pavers 
and the Exhilarating Change President Carter Wrought, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 281 (1995). Before 
reading this speech, I had not known these judges’ given names; we can be confident that Justice 
Ginsburg uses them advisedly. 
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pianist, music critic, graduate student in political science, highly 
successful law student, worker in the settlement-house movement, 
prosecutor, suffragist politician, and elected judge, first at the trial level 
and then at the Ohio Supreme Court.43 She was the first woman to serve 
on a state’s highest court, and after eleven years there (and some 
unsuccessful candidacies for Congress), in 1934 President Roosevelt 
appointed her to the Sixth Circuit—where she was again a “first woman.” 
There she served for twenty-five years and in her final year on the court 
she was its senior member and Chief Judge. In Justice Ginsburg’s words, 
Judge Allen portrayed “a catalogue of firsts,” and she continued her 
advocacy of women’s equality throughout her life. President Truman 
identified her as a possible appointee to the Supreme Court, but was 
dissuaded by Chief Justice Vinson, a Truman poker buddy. Such was life 
in the late 1940s. 
In 1949 Truman did, however, appoint Burnita Shelton Matthews as 
the first woman to serve as a federal district judge in the District of 
Columbia.44 While working for the Veterans Administration, Matthews 
had attended night law classes at National University, the forerunner of 
today’s George Washington University. She was a committed suffragist 
and had been counsel to the national Woman’s Party. The Party sought 
to repeal laws “protecting” women by excluding them from various kinds 
of work. Justice Ginsburg quotes a 1926 comment in the American Bar 
Association Journal in which Matthews, after deploring men’s inability to 
see this injustice, says, “But then it is not surprising when one remembers 
that this defective vision, this regard of discriminations as ‘protection’ is 
traditional.”45 Sound familiar? A reader of Justice Ginsburg’s article 
about these “way pavers” will notice her repeated insistence on giving 
credit to her predecessors in the struggle for equal rights for women. As 
the 1926 date for this quotation indicates, “struggle” is not too strong a 
word. Matthews had served as an active federal district judge for 
nineteen years when failing health made her accept the status of senior 
judge. In that capacity, she sat on a number of panels of the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals. When she retired in 1984, President Reagan expressed 
the nation’s gratitude for her service. 
The third judge featured in Justice Ginsburg’s 1995 article is 
California’s own Shirley Hufstedler, who almost certainly would have 
been the first woman Justice of the Supreme Court, if only President 
 
 43. Id. at 281–83. All the following references to Judge Allen are contained in this passage. 
 44. Id. at 284. All the references to Judge Matthews by Ginsburg and Brill, supra note 42, are at 
pages 284–85. 
 45. Id. at 285 (quoting Burnita Shelton Matthews, Women Should Have Equal Rights with Men: A 
Reply, 12 A.B.A. J. 117, 120 (1926)). 
Karst_63-HLJ-1197 (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2012 8:33 PM 
1206 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1197 
 
Carter had had a vacancy to fill.46 Justice Ginsburg knows her well, and 
expresses the appreciation and affection that Shirley Hufstedler has 
inspired in all who have known her. Hufstedler finished at the top of her 
class at Stanford Law School, and after about ten years in practice she 
had served as a judge in the superior court and then the California Court 
of Appeal. In 1968 President Johnson appointed her to the Ninth Circuit 
bench, where she stayed until President Carter tapped her to be the first 
Secretary for the newly created Department of Education. Justice 
Ginsburg takes note of a number of Hufstedler’s views on public issues, 
and quotes her on rights of personal privacy and on the harms done to 
children by myths of group dominance and inferiority. These excerpts 
remind us that the idea of a Justice Hufstedler had great appeal. I can 
attest that lawyers in California fully expected Hufstedler to be 
appointed to the Supreme Court—but in our era there can be only nine 
Justices at a time, and President Carter was not reelected in 1980. It may 
be, however, that the buzz about a “first woman Justice” was still audible 
in 1981, when President Reagan’s initial appointment to the Court was 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. 
To understand my next example of Justice Ginsburg’s pattern of 
crediting others for their contributions to the movement for women’s 
equality, you should know about the Court’s decision in Hoyt v. Florida,47 
the modern judicial nadir for the consideration of women’s concerns. 
The story of this case has been related by Professor Ginsburg,48 by Judge 
Ginsburg,49 and by Justice Ginsburg.50 Gwendolyn Hoyt, a battered 
woman, testified that she had been wounded, insulted, and humiliated by 
her philandering husband—on one occasion enraging her to the point 
that she responded by hitting him with their son’s baseball bat.51 He fell 
back, hit his head on a hard surface, and quickly died.52 Gwendolyn was 
convicted of second degree murder.53 All of the jurors in her case were 
men.54 Under Florida law, women were not obliged to do any jury 
service; a woman would be placed on the jury roll only if she volunteered 
and registered.55 Gwendolyn’s ACLU lawyer, Dorothy Kenyon, argued 
to the Supreme Court that, given the testimony, a jury containing women 
 
 46. Ginsburg & Brill, supra note 42, at 286. All references to Judge Hufstedler are at pages 286–87.  
 47. 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 
 48. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 451, 456 (1978) 
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Sex Equality]. 
 49. Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 2, at 13–14. 
 50. Ginsburg, Equal Stature, supra note 15, at 266. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58 (1961). 
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might well have convicted Gwendolyn of the lesser crime of 
manslaughter.56 The unanimous Warren Court, in an opinion by the 
second Justice Harlan, rejected this argument.57 The Justices saw the 
Florida law as a generous treatment of women, allowing them to keep 
their place at “the center of home and family life.”58 
Professor Ginsburg pointed out that, at the time of Hoyt, “the 
majority of adult women . . . either had not entered or had passed the 
stage when children requiring all-day or after-school care are part of the 
family unit.”59 Judge Ginsburg commented that Gwendolyn “suspected 
that women sitting in judgment on her case would better understand her 
plight and plea.”60 This view was shared by Justice Ginsburg, who made 
the point more specifically: “with some women on the jury, 
[Gwendolyn’s] state of mind at the time of the fatal blow might have 
been comprehended more accurately by her triers, and her crime 
perhaps reduced to manslaughter.”61 Justice Ginsburg later added that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoyt followed a line of precedent that 
reflected the long-prevailing “separate spheres” mentality, the notion 
that it was man’s lot, because of his nature, to be the breadwinner, the 
head of household, the representative of the family outside the home; 
and it was woman’s lot, because of her nature, to bear and alone to 
raise children and keep the house in order.62 
In 1971, when Professor Ginsburg submitted the brief in Reed v. 
Reed, on the brief’s cover she added the names of two predecessor 
advocates, both associated with the ACLU.63 One was Pauli Murray, a 
long-time fighter for racial and gender justice, and the other was Dorothy 
Kenyon, who had argued the Hoyt case ten years earlier.64 The Hoyt 
precedent itself crumbled in 197565 as the Supreme Court went about 
revising its treatment of women’s constitutional claims to equality. 
Meanwhile, Professor Ginsburg was giving credit to others who had 
helped pave the way for her successes. 
Belva Lockwood’s Tale 
Justice Ginsburg continues to give credit. In 2008, in a conversation 
with Elena Kagan, then Dean of Harvard Law School, she emphasized 
 
 56. Ginsburg, Equal Stature, supra note 15, at 266. 
 57. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 62. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 48, at 456. 
 60. Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 2, at 13. 
 61. Ginsburg, Interpretations, supra note 3, at 42. 
 62. Ginsburg, Equal Stature, supra note 15, at 266. 
 63. Id. at 267. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533–34 (1975). 
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that “we should appreciate the women on whose shoulders we stand, 
women who said the same things we said many years later, but we spoke 
at a time when society was willing to listen.”66 This conversation was 
presented to a group of women who had been graduated by the law 
school in the fifty-five years since 1953. The graduating class of 195367 
had been the first in that school’s history to include women. Justice 
Ginsburg had been a major draw for Celebration 55, and Dean Kagan 
was delighted to invite her to return.68 Much of the time was given to a 
“Q and A” session in which the dean asked questions and the Justice 
responded. But Justice Ginsburg was assigned time near the beginning 
for her own statement, and she devoted all of that time to a sketch of the 
life of Belva Lockwood (1830–1917), an early champion of women’s 
rights to equality.69 By 2008, of course, the main doctrinal battles in the 
Supreme Court had been won. To understand what the Justice had in 
mind, we must pay attention to what she emphasized in her tour through 
Lockwood’s life. All of the following story is adapted from the Justice’s 
talk. 
Lockwood grew up on a farm in upstate New York.70 She married at 
eighteen, had a child, and was widowed at age twenty-two. She went to 
college and became a schoolteacher and then a principal. At age thirty-
six, she moved to Washington, D.C., and after two years, married again. 
She was an active suffragist and she advocated equal employment 
opportunities for women, and equal pay, too. She decided to become a 
lawyer and applied for admission to law study at the National University. 
The school rejected her application, so that she would not “distract the 
attention of the young men.” She persisted, and the school eventually 
admitted her. She completed her work, but the school officials would not 
give her a diploma, for fear of reducing the value of men’s diplomas. 
Lockwood took the bull by the horns, writing to the ex officio president 
of the University—that is, the President of the United States, the Union’s 
soldier-hero, Ulysses S. Grant. She did not beg. She said she had 
completed the work, and “I demand my diploma.” Two weeks later, the 
Chancellor gave her the degree and the diploma. That was 1873, mind 
you. 
 
 66. Ginsburg & Kagan, supra note 28, at 237. 
 67. My own class, as it happens. When we started in the fall of 1950, there were twelve women, 
three for each section. 
 68. At one point, Justice Ginsburg was discussing changes in the Supreme Court and the 
appointment of women. She mentioned that Justice Stevens, then eighty-eight, might be the next to 
retire. Ginsburg & Kagan, supra note 28, at 245. When he did retire, as you know, Elena Kagan (then 
serving as Solicitor General) filled that vacancy. 
 69. Id. at 234–37. 
 70. Id. at 235. All references in this paragraph are at page 235. 
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Three years of law practice in D.C. entitled Lockwood to apply for 
admission to the bar of the U.S. Supreme Court—but the Court denied 
her application.71 End of story, right? Wrong. She took her case to 
Congress, which in 1879 adopted a law entitling a woman to be admitted 
to practice before the Supreme Court if she met the qualifications 
applied to men.72 Thus, Belva Lockwood was the first woman to argue a 
case before the Court.73 During her years at the Supreme Court bar, she 
twice ran for President as the candidate of the Equal Rights Party.74 A 
woman still could not vote, but nothing in the Constitution said she could 
not be elected President. Her campaigns brought to the public’s notice a 
number of issues that other candidates ignored—supporting not just 
women’s rights but also the causes of Native Americans and Chinese 
immigrants and Civil War veterans.75 Throughout all of these tribulations, 
she believed her cause would prevail. 
Justice Ginsburg went on to tell the assembled women that she had 
decorated her own chambers with a replica of the vote of the Justices 
refusing to admit Lockwood to the Court’s bar, and with “one of several 
less than flattering cartoons published during her 1884 presidential run 
against Cleveland and Blaine.”76 
All right—so what’s going on in this meeting, at this late date in the 
movement for women’s equality? Justice Ginsburg has seen an 
opportunity to teach, this time to an audience of women, most of whom 
see themselves as committed advocates for the cause they share with her. 
Her telling of Belva Lockwood’s story personalizes some lessons to be 
learned—and learned again: 
 Belief in equal justice is not enough. You have an obligation to 
take action to achieve full equality. 
 You must be determined to overcome obstacles. 
 You must extend your efforts to the limit of your ability. 
 Courage is often required; don’t be afraid. 
 Be optimistic; it can be done. 
Just reading such a set of instructions may be intimidating, but it is 
also affecting. When the teacher has credentials as strong as Justice 
 
 71. Id. Justice Ginsburg points out that Chief Justice Waite, when he gave her the bad news, did 
not mention his own vote in favor of her admission. But only three Justices out of the nine had voted 
for her. Id. at 235–36. 
 72. Ginsburg & Kagan, supra note 28, at 236. 
 73. Justice Ginsburg tells us that Lockwood, soon after her own admission, moved the admission 
of Samuel R. Lowery to practice. He thus became the first African American lawyer from the South to 
join the Court’s bar. Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 237. 
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Ginsburg’s, the lessons must be heeded. Furthermore, her own 
performance at the bar and on the bench shows that one can be firm and 
still be conciliatory. Speaking of her present position, she has said, 
“We’re in the business of persuasion.”77 
The Social Setting for VMI 
The Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in United States v. Virginia78 has 
been detailed and analyzed over and over. On the chance that there is 
one reader who does not know: In that case the Court held that the 
exclusion of women from Virginia Military Institute violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.79 I had my say on the case soon after the decision 
came down,80 and I shall not add another analysis to the stack. In the 
view of Mary Anne Case, VMI was “an extremely easy case, the logical 
culmination of a long line of cases . . . . Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
author of the majority opinion, stands at both ends of this line, now able 
to affirm as a Justice what she first argued as an advocate.”81 Even so, it is 
notable that the Supreme Court reached its decision by a 7–1 vote, with 
Chief Justice Rehnquist joining in the result.82 
In this case, Justice Ginsburg had no occasion to dramatize the issue 
before the Court with a particular woman’s story. The plaintiff, after all, 
was the United States, which had sued after the Justice Department 
learned, in an official way, of VMI’s males-only policy.83 A high school 
girl had complained to the Department in 1990,84 but the district judge 
had not even mentioned her name in his opinion.85 VMI and its “expert” 
witnesses made clear that women were being excluded because VMI is a 
military school and war is man’s business. That was quite enough for 
Justice Scalia, whose dissent, predictably, resonated in the higher 
 
 77. Ginsburg & Kagan, supra note 28, at 240. 
 78. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 79. Id. at 519. 
 80. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, “The Way Women Are”: Some Notes in the Margin for Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, 20 U. Haw. L. Rev. 619 (1998). 
 81. Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1447, 1450 (2000). 
 82. The Chief Justice did not join Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court, but still concluded 
that VMI’s exclusion of female applicants violated the Equal Protection Clause. United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 558 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). If Justice Thomas had not recused himself, my 
guess is that he would have joined Justice Scalia in dissent. Justice Thomas’s son was attending VMI. 
 83. The United States sued under Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 
(2010). United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (W.D. Va. 1991). 
 84. Id. It is worth noting that the lawsuit was brought by the Department during the 
administration of the first President Bush. 
 85. Id. at 1407. 
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registers of voice.86 Six years later, however, Justice Ginsburg remarked 
that the case had not been “a close call,” and she added: 
  Public understanding had advanced so that people could perceive that 
the VMI case was not really about the military. Nor did the Court 
question the value of single-sex schools. Instead, VMI was about a State 
that invested heavily in a college designed to produce business and civic 
leaders, that for generations succeeded admirably in the endeavor, and 
that strictly limited this unparalleled opportunity to men.87 
The reference to public understanding brings us to another theme 
that pervades Justice Ginsburg’s writings: the importance of changes in 
the public’s attitudes in underpinning the Supreme Court’s changes in 
constitutional interpretation. As she said in 2008, “Courts are reactive 
institutions . . . . [Social change] has to start with the people.”88 
Looking back to her litigation campaign of the 1970s, Judge 
Ginsburg said, “I was lucky to be in the right place, at the right time.”89 
Indeed, the times had been changing in a number of ways that were 
undermining traditional forms of sex discrimination. Just before she 
became a judge, Professor Ginsburg had called attention to some of 
these social changes: a decline in the need for women to produce at 
home; an expansion of the service sector of the economy, offering new 
jobs to women; increased availability of means to control reproduction; 
increased life spans.90 The two-earner family was rapidly becoming the 
standard.91 All of these developments increased judges’—including 
Justices’—awareness of “a sea change in United States society,” an 
“evolving enlightenment” intensified by “the briefs filed in Court, the 
women lawyers and jurists they nowadays routinely encounter, and 
perhaps most deeply by the aspirations of the women, particularly the 
daughters and granddaughters in their own families and communities.”92 
As Justice Ginsburg told Elena Kagan in discussing the 1970s litigation 
campaign, “we spoke at a time when society was willing to listen.”93 
Referring to earlier women’s rights litigators, she added immediately, in 
 
 86. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 566–603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 87. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Supreme Court: A Place for Women, 32 Sw. U. L. Rev. 189, 197 
(2003) (2002 speech at Southwestern University School of Law) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Place for 
Women]. 
 88. Ginsburg & Kagan, supra note 28, at 243. 
 89. Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 2, at 11. 
 90. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 
1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 161, 167. 
 91. Id.; see Ginsburg, Equal Stature, supra note 15, at 269. 
 92. Ginsburg, Place for Women, supra note 87, at 198. Klarman, supra note 8, at 291–94, shows 
how the changing climate for social reform offered complications to Professor Ginsburg’s litigation 
campaign. (After all, if conditions for women’s participation in society are improving, who needs 
litigation?) Professor Klarman makes clear that she met the challenge. Id. at 297–98. 
 93. Ginsburg & Kagan, supra note 28, at 237. 
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a way that we now see as typical of her, to give credit to those who had 
gone before: “[These] women . . . were saying a generation before, the 
same things we were saying, . . . but society was not yet prepared to 
listen. So we were standing on their shoulders, and they were models of 
courage for us because they didn’t take no for an answer.”94 
The shade of Belva Lockwood smiled. 
 
 94. Id. at 238. 
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